During Schroeder's chancellorship, trade between Germany and Russia boomed, and
Russia gave Germany special benefits as an energy partner. Germany -- in accordance
with Putin's plan -- began supporting Russia's position in Europe on specific strategic
issues. Schroeder's Germany was alone among Western governments in not vociferously
supporting Ukraine's Orange Revolution in 2004-2005. Schroeder also led European
opposition to U.S. efforts to begin the NATO accession process for Ukraine and Georgia.
As his friendship with Putin grew, Schroeder purchased an estate outside Moscow
near Putin's home and even sought Putin's assistance in adopting two Russian children.
Schroeder's ejection from office in 2005 did not end their friendship -- or Schroeder's
usefulness to Putin. Despite widespread German criticism, even from Schroeder's
own party, the former chancellor accepted a position with Russian state natural gas firm Gazprom to lead
the Nord Stream project, a pipeline designed specifically to maximize Russia's
energy leverage over Belarus, Ukraine and Poland.
Having created a strong relationship with Berlin, Putin established a similar relationship
with France's then-President Jacques Chirac.
France's position is different from Germany's in that France is not connected
economically or politically with Russia. However, Paris understands the history
of strong Berlin-Moscow ties and what those mean for all of Europe. France thus
has an interest in making sure it is not left out when Russia and Germany meet.
The relationship between Chirac and Putin took this a step further.
At the beginning of their relationship, Putin and Chirac allied politically against
the U.S.-led war in Iraq. This was important to Moscow because it
undermined NATO's unity on a critical issue. More important for Russia's
interests, Chirac lobbied against NATO's expansion to include the Baltic states
of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The Baltics were admitted despite Chirac's objections,
and when the next NATO summit occurred -- in Latvia -- Chirac invited Putin to the
meeting as his guest.
Putin was close friends with the French and German leaders, but he was like a brother
to Italy's then-Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. This relationship was more personal,
because Italy was not as strategic (or threatening) as the other two European powers.
Putin and Berlusconi vacationed together, spent birthdays together and bought each
other expensive gifts. In 2011, when Berlusconi was on trial for sexual improprieties,
Putin publically defended his friend, saying the allegations were "made out of envy."
The Putin-Berlusconi friendship led to
relationships between Russian and Italian energy companies, banks and military
industrial projects. Most notable, Putin was able to use his relationship with Berlusconi
to get Gazprom access to Italian state-linked energy giant ENI's assets throughout
North Africa, particularly in Libya.
Putin's personal connections with Germany, France and Italy did not change with
the leadership shifts in each country from 2005 to 2007, nor did they change when
Putin left the presidential spotlight to become prime minister in 2008. Putin used
the momentum built under the previous governments to forge relationships -- even
if not as personal -- with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Nicolas
Sarkozy and (for a time) Italy's then-Prime Minister Romano Prodi. Putin's circle
of friends and associates helped him shape some of Russia's most important strategies
in Europe: complicating NATO expansion, pushing Moscow's agenda with NATO, expanding
military relationships and becoming
capable of invading Georgia without European or NATO intervention. It is
not that all of this was possible because of Putin's personal relationships with
the leaders of Italy, France and Germany, but those connections facilitated many
of the deals that made Russia's progress possible.
Changes Across Europe
As Putin returns to the presidency, he faces a very different Europe -- one in which
nearly all of his close friends are out of power. As prime minister, Putin focused
on Russia's internal issues while Europe became embroiled in a political and financial
crisis that has affected the Continent as a whole. Europe is not as concerned as
it once was with the wider world (including Russia). Instead, each state is focused
on keeping itself -- and some form of the European alliance -- intact.
Voters have ejected two of the three Russian-friendly European governments during
these crises.
Berlusconi and his political machine were forced from power in favor of
technocrat and now Prime Minister Mario Monti. Monti lacks the political mandate
or the will to become involved in geopolitical alignments like a close relationship
with Russia. France's Chirac has retired from politics, and
Sarkozy was voted out of office the day before Putin was inaugurated. France's
Hollande surrounds himself with politicians who have not been in government at any
point when Putin was in charge in Russia. This leaves Merkel, whose ties with Putin
are the weakest in the Russian leader's European circle. Furthermore, Merkel is
concerned with holding Europe together, leaving little time or interest for Russia's
plans for Europe.
Thus, Putin's tactic of using personal relationships to help strengthen Russia's
position in Europe seems to be outdated. The French and Italian governments are
still young, so Putin could try to build relationships with Hollande and Monti.
But, like Germany, France and Italy are more interested in what is happening in
Europe than in Russia.
This new attitude toward Russia already has surfaced in Rome. In the first talks
between the new Italian government and the Russian government, Italian President
Giorgio Napolitano made it clear that the Moscow-Rome relationship would undergo
a "depersonalization." The first evidence of this was Italy's embrace of
U.S.
ballistic missile defense plans for Europe. Italy -- like France --
long supported Russia's position on missile defense in Europe. Although this did
not prevent Washington from moving forward with its plans, it did create disagreements
within NATO. Italy's shift toward unity with NATO and the United States comes just before what was to be a NATO-Russia summit in Chicago, but Russia has been disinvited.
The changes in Europe's leadership and focus come amid Russia's adjustments to other
new dynamics in Europe. Before the Continent's financial and political crises, Russia
had forged a new strategy for
foreign policy regarding Europe in which strategic European partners --
especially Germany, France and Italy -- would invest heavily in Russia's economy
and financial sector. With Europe nearly broke, however, this
strategy has been cut back and could be abandoned altogether. Russia is
proceeding with European partners on some projects, but Moscow must financially
step up more than it anticipated for these projects to succeed. It is an expensive
foreign policy choice.
Russia's main goal regarding Europe is to keep European powers divided while extracting
what Moscow wants financially and technologically. The days have passed when Putin
could
call a friend in Europe to help with NATO or with technological deficiencies.
Russia has to design a new strategy to deal with a very different Europe and adhere
to its deeper imperatives rather than rely on personal and political relationships,
which are fleeting compared to the forces of geopolitics.
A
nalysis@stratfor.com
Customer Service, Access, Account Issues -
service@stratfor.com
